



2 October 1962

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: WPS Paper, 'Implementation of the Command Relationships Agreement' (10 September 1962)

25X1 1. In response to the DDCI's request that subject paper be reviewed in the light of his concern over implications it might have in regard to CIA's current restudy of NSAM 57, I met with [redacted] along with my Deputy [redacted] and [redacted] proposed the following comments which [redacted] accepted and asked me to forward to you for General Carter's information:

a. The JCS letter pertains to implementation of the Command Relationships Agreement. It does not address itself to responsibility for paramilitary operations.

b. The JCS reference to NSAM 57 was in justification of a contention that a procedure should be established for making a joint (DCI-C/JCS) determination to activate CRA without regard to Defense Readiness Conditions.

c. Activation of CRA by joint determination is in the best interests of the Agency. It is a safeguard against an inappropriate decision based on NSAM 57.

d. A statement of dissenting CIA views on a Presidential decision should be an independent action. To be effective, an attempt to modify NSAM 57 should be addressed to a recipient other than the JCS.

e. The proposed reply to the JCS on implementation of CRA is appropriate, has been thoroughly coordinated within the Agency, protects the interests of the Agency in the controversial area of paramilitary responsibility, and should be released.

2. If there is further clarification required by General Carter, I or members of my Staff are always available.

This being done by CA!

3. In order that you will be reassured that this paper received the customary careful coordination and review, I attach for your own information an aide-memoire from which the above recommendations to General Carter were drawn.

4. Also attached, for General Carter's signature as recommended, is subject paper.



Chief, War Plans Staff

2 Attachments:
As stated

10 SEP 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Implementation of Command Relationships Agreement (CRA)

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence from Chairman, JCS (JCSM-570-62), dated 2 August 1962, Subject as Above (Tab D)

1. This memorandum recommends action on the part of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, as stated in paragraph 5 below.

2. Background:

- a. Tab A contains a memorandum from C/WPS to DD/P recommending that CIA accept, for planning purposes, that CRA will be implemented at ORA or DEFCON 1 and that the DCI and JCS should jointly determine whether or not CRA, "in fact," should be implemented.
- b. Tab B contains a memorandum from DD/P to DCI recommending that the concept noted at "a," above, be approved.
- c. Tab C contains a memorandum from DDCI to Chairman, JCS, outlining the concept noted at "a," above, and requesting comments and/or concurrence.
- d. By subject reference (Tab D), the Chairman, JCS, responded to the DDCI and agreed that, for planning purposes, a point in time for implementation of CRA is logical. In addition, the JCS stated that: (1) It is essential that CIA Forces which have been planned for unified and specified commanders be made available automatically to such commanders upon the declaration of a world-wide DEFCON 1 or Defense Emergency; (2) in a DEFCON 1 situation which is less than world-wide, JCS-DCI can jointly determine whether or not the CIA Force should be activated; (3) in large covert paramilitary operations

where CIA has a support role, regardless of declaration of DEFCON 1, DCI-JCS should jointly decide whether or not the CIA Force should be activated; and (4) Senior War Planners should identify, in each of their plans, the CIA elements to be included in the CIA Force.

3. Discussion:

a. The CRA contains the principles under which the CIA supports unified and specified commanders in a wartime situation where American Forces are actively engaged. A basic principle is that, upon implementation of CRA, a CIA Force is organized under a CIA Commander and the Force comes under operational control of the Military on the same level as the Theater Army, Navy, and Air Force components present in the theater of operations. The CIA elements to be included in the CIA Force are those which are assigned by the DCI, and his technical and administrative control over the Force is analogous to that exercised by the Military Service Secretaries over their Service components. Timing for activation of the Force is as noted above, that is, "where American Forces are actively engaged."

b. Our original proposal to JCS, regarding planning for implementation of CRA prior to commencement of hostilities, was based upon the belief that declaration of a DEFCON 1 or ORA would be preceded by discussions at the national level. During these discussions and prior to declaration of DEFCON 1, the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI would have jointly determined whether or not CRA would be implemented in EUCOM or PACOM. The JCS have accepted the CIA concept of joint determination prior to declaration of a DEFCON 1 which is less than world-wide in scope. In paragraph 6b of the Reference, Chairman, JCS, indicates that he will direct unified and specified commanders to include in their plans provisions for recommending to JCS as to activation of the CIA Force, or elements thereof, whenever consideration is being given to implementing an operations plan. We believe, however, that the need for joint review at the time a recommendation is made to declare a world-wide DEFCON 1 is greater than if only one command area is to be affected. A major point to be considered is that a recommendation will be made to declare DEFCON 1, regardless of whether or not it is world-wide or restricted in scope. The recommendations will be made

when the available information indicates that opening of hostilities is highly probable. It does not mean that war is inevitable. If an appreciable time lag marks the transition from peace to war, political negotiations will be in progress, and it may well be that CIA can best operate as an integrated agency in carrying out its national responsibilities, rather than under operational control of the several unified and specified commanders. We believe that in areas, such as Latin America, Africa (South of the Sahara), and in some neutral nations, some elements of CIA might well be excluded from operational control of military authorities, regardless of whether or not they have been included in plans for the CIA Force. If, by Presidential decision, the authority within such areas remains with an Ambassador and CRA is implemented, certain CIA field elements could well remain subject to direction of political authorities. In this regard, CIA plans must be more definitive as to the stations and bases which the DCI believes should be assigned to the CIA Force. This is particularly important in those geographical areas where there is little chance of American Forces being actively engaged in combat operations.

c. It is for the above reasons that CIA must insist that when the question as to whether or not to declare DEFCON 1 is under discussion at national level, the interrelated question as to whether or not CRA will be implemented should be decided upon.

d. The JCS have provided for joint discussions to determine the support CIA can offer the Military in situations short of general war whether or not DEFCON 1 or "Defense Emergency" is declared. CIA plans have been based upon the principle that a joint determination would apply in such cases. The CIA Global War Plan states that plans must be sufficiently flexible to provide for the activation of a CIA Force, which will include only those assets within the limited war area, for the conduct of CIA operations in support of military limited war operations.

4. Conclusions:

a. CIA plans should contain provisions for the implementation of CRA at the declaration of DEFCON 1, but it should not be automatic. The timing and scope as to implementation of CRA and activation of the CIA Force should be determined jointly by the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI at the time national authorities are considering whether or not to declare DEFCON 1.

b. In contingency situations short of general war where American Forces are actively engaged, the CIA role in support of military operations will be as jointly agreed upon by the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI.

c. For planning purposes, CIA should include in its General War and Contingency Plans those elements of CIA which will constitute the CIA Force to support military operations upon implementation of such plans.

5. Recommendations:

a. That you approve the conclusions noted at paragraph 4, above.

b. That you sign the attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. This does not complete action on subject reference. Upon your approval of the recommendations noted above, WPS will prepare the policy guidance necessary.



Chief, War Plans Staff

5 Attachments: (w/orig only)
Tabs A, B, C, and D, and
Memo for Chairman, JCS,
as stated